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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

APPROACHES TO BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION: SOME
NOTES ON TEACHING A SEMINAL CASE

JOEL K. GOLDSTEIN*
During the past year, dozens of American law schools commemorated the
fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education.1 The attention was
appropriate because Brown is one of the Supreme Court’s seminal decisions.
By all appearances, the fiftieth anniversary of Brown attracted much more
attention than did, say, the 200th anniversary of Marbury v. Madison2 in 2003
or the centennial of Lochner v. New York3 this year. Brown’s unique
significance resides in part in the fact that it changed America’s constitutional
norm regarding race, our most embarrassing and vexing problem. In
effectively overturning the doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson4 that separate but
equal was consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, Brown rejected
apartheid as a constitutional principle to organize American society. It went
“where no court had ever gone before: to dismantle an entrenched social
order.”5 As such it has become “a beloved legal and political icon.”6

* Professor of Law, Saint Louis University School of Law. I am grateful to my research
assistants Anthony Gilbreth, Jackie Loerop, and Tim McFarlin and to Margaret McDermott, J.D.
of the Saint Louis University School of Law Poos Library for their able assistance, and to Mary
Dougherty for patiently retyping drafts of this Essay. I am alone responsible for its shortcomings.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See, e.g., Brown@50 Symposium, 47 HOW. L.J. 1 (2003); Survey,
Reflections on Brown v. Board of Education and the Civil Rights Movement in Virginia, 39 U.
RICH. L. REV. 1 (2004); Symposium, 50 Years of Brown v. Board of Education, 90 U. VA. L.
REV. 1537 (2004); Symposium: Brown at Fifty, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1302 (2004); Symposium,
Brown v. Board of Education at Fifty: Have We Achieved Its Goals?, 78 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 253
(2004); Symposium, Brown v. Board of Education: Fifty Years Later, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 791
(2004); Symposium, Revisiting Brown v. Board of Education: 50 Years of Legal and Social
Debate, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 279 (2005).
2. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See, e.g., Judicial Review: Blessing or Curse? or Both? A
Symposium in Commemoration of the Bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison, 38 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 313 (2003); Marbury at 200: A Bicentennial Celebration of Marbury v. Madison: Marbury
as History, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 205 (2003); Symposium: Marbury v. Madison, 200 Years of
Judicial Review in America, 71 TENN. L. REV. 217 (2004).
3. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
5. LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 27 (2000).
6. Jack M. Balkin, Brown as Icon, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD
HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL
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It was not surprising that Brown so captivated American law schools last
year during its golden anniversary. It attracted attention at each of its earlier
milestone anniversaries.7 Do we give it the same level of attention on a regular
basis in our Constitutional Law courses? It is difficult to know for sure
without surveying Constitutional Law teachers—a task I have not undertaken.
A review of Constitutional Law casebooks suggests we do not. A few provide
extensive materials regarding Brown, but most treat Brown no differently than
most other cases. A few notes typically introduce or follow the brief opinion,
and then it’s on to the next case. Of course, casebook pages are scarce, and the
absence of extensive discussion of Brown in the casebooks does not mean that
those teaching Constitutional Law do not spend days on it. Perhaps most
Constitutional Law teachers know so much about Brown that the casebooks
need provide little background. In any event, Brown is worth dwelling upon.
It should be, perhaps with Marbury v. Madison and McCulloch v. Maryland,8
the focal point of a Constitutional Law curriculum.
Brown’s subject matter alone would justify giving it more time than most
other cases. It is, after all, the third in a trilogy of prominent cases dealing with
race, after Dred Scott v. Sandford9 and Plessy v. Ferguson, and the only one of
RIGHTS DECISION 3 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) [hereinafter BALKIN]; see also Earl Maltz, Brown
v. Board of Education and “Originalism,” in GREAT CASES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 142
(Robert P. George ed., 2000) (calling Brown a “constitutional icon”).
7. See, e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg, Reflections: Twentieth Anniversary of Brown v. Board of
Education, 50 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 106 (1974-1975); A Dedication to Mr. Justice Marshall on
the Twenty-Fifth Anniversary: Brown v. Board of Education, 54 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1979); Robert
L. Carter, Reexamining Brown Twenty-Five Years Later: Looking Backward into the Future, 14
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 615 (1979); Theodore M. Hesburgh, Brown After Twenty-Five Years,
28 EMORY L.J. 933 (1979); Betsy Levin, Symposium: Educational Equality Thirty Years after
Brown v. Board of Education, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 487 (1984); Nathaniel R. Jones, The
Desegregation of Urban Schools Thirty Years After Brown, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 515 (1984);
David Hall & George Henderson, Thirty Years after Brown: Looking Ahead, 24 WASHBURN L.J.
227 (1985); Daniel Gordon, Happy Anniversary Brown v. Board of Education: In Need of a
Remake After Forty Years?, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 107 (1993); Davison M. Douglas,
The Promise of Brown Forty Years Later: Introduction, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 337 (1995); J.
Clay Smith, Jr. & Lisa C. Wilson, Brown on White College Campuses: Forty Years of Brown v.
Board of Education, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 733 (1995); Murray Dry, Brown v. Board of
Education at Forty: Where Are We? Where Do We Go from Here?, 1 RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.
DIG. 8 (1995); Thomas B. McAffee, The Brown Symposium—An Introduction, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J.
1 (1995); Norman Williams, Jr., Using Discourse Ethics to Provide Equality in Education for
African-American Children Forty Years after Brown v. Board of Education, 5 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
99 (1995); Robert W. McGee, Brown v. Board of Education: More Than Forty Years of Asking
the Wrong Question & the Case for Privatization of Education, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 141
(1997); Cheryl Brown Henderson, The Legacy of Brown Forty Six Years Later, 40 WASHBURN L.
J. 70 (2000); Drew S. Days, III, In Search of Educational E/Quality Forty-Six Years After Brown
v. Board of Education, 54 SMU L. REV. 2089 (2001).
8. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
9. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
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the three that virtually all Americans now find palatable. Brown clearly
influenced the course of constitutional law during the subsequent half century.
It heralded a new way of thinking about law. Yet Brown’s pedagogical
significance does not stem simply from the importance of the topic it addressed
and the result it reached. Brown also affords a rare opportunity to explore a
whole range of central questions relating to constitutional law. How should
courts interpret the Constitution? How much difference can judicial decisions
make?
The professor’s task is made easier by the vast literature Brown has
spawned during the last half-century. More than 2170 reported cases cite it.10
Moreover, scholars have subjected it to book-length studies.11 Symposia
celebrate each anniversary.12 Thus, teachers have a wealth of information to
draw upon in teaching Brown.
The purpose of this Essay is simply to suggest some of the angles teachers
can usefully take in presenting Brown. This Essay is not exhaustive, nor does
it seek to resolve the issues it raises. It draws heavily upon the rich corpus of
work on Brown to summarize some issues that might contribute to a
Constitutional Law course.
I. THE CASE(S)
Brown, of course, involved a challenge to the racially segregated school
systems that prevailed in many states in the early 1950s.13 In Brown, the Court
considered and decided cases from Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and
Delaware addressing state practices that separated white and black children in
public schools.14 A case from the District of Columbia, Bolling v. Sharpe,15
was argued with the state cases but was the subject of a separate opinion. The
District Court in Bolling had dismissed the case.16 In Gebhart v. Belton, a
Delaware state court struck down laws requiring racially segregated schools
10. This number was generated from the Westlaw “Citing References” list for Brown.
11. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 6; ROBERT J. COTTROL ET AL., BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION: CASTE, CULTURE AND THE CONSTITUTION (2003); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA’S STRUGGLE
FOR EQUALITY (Vintage Books 2004) (1975); J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, FROM BROWN TO
BAKKE: THE SUPREME COURT AND SCHOOL INTEGRATION: 1954–1978 (1979).
12. See supra notes 1, 7 and accompanying text.
13. Some seventeen Southern and border states required that public schools be segregated in
1954. See THE SUPREME COURT IN CONFERENCE (1940–1985): THE PRIVATE DISCUSSIONS
BEHIND NEARLY 300 SUPREME COURT DECISIONS, 646 n.35 (Del Dickson ed., 2001) [hereinafter
DICKSON]. Four states (Kansas, New Mexico, Arizona, and Wyoming) gave local school boards
discretion. Id.
14. 347 U.S. 483, 486–88 & n.1 (1954).
15. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
16. The District Court’s dismissal was unpublished, but for the history of the case at this
stage, see KLUGER, supra note 11, at 523–24.
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and ordered Delaware’s schools to integrate immediately until equal schools
could be created.17 In Brown v. Board of Education, the lower court had found
that segregated schools harmed black children but refused to order
desegregation on the grounds that the white and black schools were
substantially equal.18 In Virginia and South Carolina, the lower courts found
that the black schools were inferior and ordered the defendants to equalize the
schools.19
The states relied on the doctrine from Plessy v. Ferguson,20 which had held
that racially “separate but equal” railcars were consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause.21 The doctrine had provided the basis for many states to
operate separate or dual school systems.22 They were rarely equal. During the
1930s and 1940s, the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (“NAACP”) had brought suits challenging segregation in institutions of
higher education. In a number of cases, the Supreme Court had required states
to furnish equal opportunities for black students to study law or pursue other
graduate studies. In Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, the Court ordered
Missouri to admit a black man to its law school.23 It could not meet its
obligation to provide all qualified residents the same opportunity for training
by sending Gaines to school in a neighboring state.24 Ten years later, in Sipuel
v. Board of Regents of University of Oklahoma, the Court ordered Oklahoma to
educate Ms. Sipuel in accordance with the Equal Protection Clause.25 Finally,
in 1950 the Court decided Sweatt v. Painter26 and McLaurin v. Oklahoma State
Regents.27 In Sweatt, the Court found that Texas could not provide Herman
Sweatt an equal legal education in a separate school for blacks.28 The quality
of a legal education turned in part on intangible factors—reputation of faculty,
alumni network, etc.29 Because Texas could not furnish Sweatt an equivalent
education, it was required to admit him to the University of Texas Law

17. 91 A.2d 137, 140, 152 (Del. 1952); see Brown, 347 U.S. at 487–88 n.1.
18. 98 F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951); see Brown, 347 U.S. at 487 n.1.
19. Davis v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward County, 103 F. Supp. 337, 340–41 (E.D. Va.
1952), rev’d by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Briggs v. Elliot, 103 F. Supp. 920,
923 (E.D. S.C. 1952), rev’d by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); see also Brown, 347
U.S. at 486–87 n.1.
20. 163 U.S. 537, 548–49 (1896).
21. Brown, 347 U.S. at 488.
22. See DICKSON, supra note 13, at 646 n.35.
23. 305 U.S. 337, 352 (1938).
24. Id. at 349–50.
25. 332 U.S. 631, 633 (1948).
26. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
27. 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
28. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633–34.
29. Id. at 634.
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School.30 In McLaurin, the Court held that Oklahoma could not subject
George W. McLaurin to different treatment than white students received (i.e.,
segregated seating) in its graduate school.31 In these cases, the Court was able
to rule in favor of the black student without holding Plessy unconstitutional. In
each case, separate schools were not or would not be equal. Thus, the cases
did not force the Court to overrule Plessy or abandon the separate but equal
doctrine.
Brown presented that question clearly, particularly because the lower court
had found Kansas was providing substantially equal separate schools.32 As
Professor Lucas A. Powe, Jr. has written, “although everyone knew that Negro
schools had less of everything except leaky roofs than white schools, these
cases were intentionally litigated on the assumption that everything except
student assignments was equal.”33 The Court first heard arguments on the
cases in 1952.34 The discussions at conference on December 13, 1952,
revealed that the Court was split on the disposition of the cases.35 Although
Justices Black, Douglas, Burton, and Minton were prepared to hold that
segregated schools violated the Equal Protection Clause and/or the Fifth
Amendment Due Process Clause,36 Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and
Clark seemed disposed to reaffirm Plessy’s separate but equal doctrine.37
Justices Frankfurter and Jackson seemed troubled by the lack of conventional
legal arguments to support striking down Plessy.38 Rather than render a
divided ruling, the Court unanimously ordered that all cases be reargued
regarding the original intent of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Court’s
equitable powers.39
Fate intervened. Chief Justice Vinson died on September 8, 1953.
President Eisenhower had previously promised California Governor Earl
Warren the first Supreme Court opening.40 Although Eisenhower may have
intended to appoint Warren as an associate justice, Warren interpreted their

30. Id. at 635–36.
31. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 640, 642.
32. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492 (1954).
33. POWE, supra note 5, at 29.
34. Brown, 347 U.S. at 488.
35. See DICKSON, supra note 13, at 644–53; see also POWE, supra note 5, at 23; KLUGER,
supra note 11, at 617–18.
36. See DICKSON, supra note 13, at 648, 652–53.
37. Id. at 646–49, 653.
38. Id. at 651–52.
39. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. Et al., 345 U.S. 972 (1953). See generally DICKSON, supra note
13, at 644–53. See POWE, supra note 5, at 23; KLUGER, supra note 11, at 618–19.
40. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND HIS SUPREME COURT—A
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 2 (1983).
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agreement to extend to the Chief Justiceship, and ultimately Eisenhower
appointed him.41
The cases were reargued on December 7–9, 1953,42 and initially discussed
in conference on December 12, 1953.43 At this time Warren was acting under
a recess appointment.44
On May 17, 1954, the Court issued unanimous decisions in Brown and in
Bolling holding that separate but equal had no place in public education.45
Both opinions were brief. Brown contained thirteen paragraphs spread over
thirteen pages of Volume 347 of the U.S. Reports.46 In fact, the critical part of
the opinion was shorter than even this description suggests. The first three
pages listed headnotes and counsel.47 The next three outlined facts and
procedural matters.48 Two pages explained the inconclusive nature of the
Court’s effort to determine whether the framers intended the Equal Protection
Clause to preclude school segregation.49 Almost two more pages introduced
the “separate but equal” doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson and sought to
distinguish it as applying to transportation, not education.50 The last page was
a briefing order.51
The Court devoted only about two and one-half pages to outlining the
rationale of the opinion. The Court could not “turn the clock back to 1868
when the [Fourteenth] Amendment was adopted” or to 1896 when it decided
Plessy.52 Instead, it “must consider public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout the Nation.”53
The Court noted the paramount role of public education “to our democratic
society.”54 It was a prerequisite to discharging basic civic responsibilities.55 It
inculcated American values.56 “In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an
education.”57 The states must provide education to all on equal terms.58

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 5–7.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 483 (1954).
DICKSON, supra note 13, at 654.
Id. at 653.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495; Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
Brown, 347 U.S. at 483–96.
Id. at 483–85.
Id. at 486–88.
Id. at 489–90.
Id. at 490–92.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495–96.
Id. at 492.
Id. at 492–93.
Id. at 493.
Id.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
Id. at 493.
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Separate but equal schools harmed black children. “To separate them from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”59 “Modern authority”
supported this finding.60 That authority included psychological studies arguing
that school segregation harmed African-American children.61 Thus, “in the
field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ ha[d] no place.”62
The Court concluded its opinion by directing the parties to present further
argument regarding questions as to remedy that had previously been
proposed.63
Bolling required less than four pages.64 Because Congress had jurisdiction
over the public schools in the District of Columbia,65 the Fifth Amendment
applied.66 Unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, it did not contain an Equal
Protection Clause. Yet equal protection and due process both came from the
American concept of “fairness.”67 Racial classifications “must be scrutinized
with particular care, since they are contrary to our traditions and hence
constitutionally suspect.”68 Liberty, as protected by the Due Process Clause,
could not be restricted for arbitrary reasons but only for some “proper
governmental objective.”69 School segregation was not such an objective.70
Because the Equal Protection Clause precluded the states from operating
segregated schools, “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would
impose a lesser duty on the Federal Government.”71
Finally, on May 31, 1955, some fifty-four weeks after the Court issued the
aforementioned opinions, the Court delivered its opinion relating to remedial
issues.72 The Court recognized that implementation of the constitutional
principles it had stated might require different responses in different
localities.73 It remanded the cases to the courts that had originally heard

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id.
Id. at 494.
Id.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.
Id. at 495.
Id. at 495–96 & n. 13.
347 U.S. 497, 497–500 (1954).
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499 (discussing U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV).
Id.
Id. at 499.
Id. at 499–500.
Id. at 500.
Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (“Brown II”).
Id. at 298, 299.
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them.74 While recognizing “the personal interest of the plaintiffs in admission
to public schools as soon as practicable on a nondiscriminatory basis,” the
Court also noted the “public interest in the elimination of [a variety of]
obstacles in a systematic and effective manner.”75 School boards must make a
good-faith beginning, in other words “a prompt and reasonable start toward
full compliance.”76 District courts should act “with all deliberate speed” to
admit plaintiffs to public schools on a racially nondiscriminatory basis.77
II. WHAT DID BROWN DECIDE
At the most basic level, Brown and Bolling decided that the Constitution
prohibited federal or state government from operating racially segregated
public schools. Although the decisions made this result clear, they left broader
implications murky. The Court wrote the decision narrowly, specifically
limiting it to education: “We conclude that in the field of public education the
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.”78
The cases dealt with public elementary and secondary schools, and the
Court referred to children.79 The Court did not overrule Plessy generally.
Indeed, its rejection of certain specific language in Plessy80 implied that it
otherwise stood.
In important respects, the decision proved broader than its language
suggested. Although Brown spoke only of public education, it clearly had a
wider impact than its language hinted. In short order the Court made clear that
pursuant to Brown, Plessy and the Jim Crow laws it sustained were invalid.
Ten months after the Court’s decision, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit unanimously applied Brown to bar Baltimore from operating
racially segregated public beaches and bathhouses.81 It was “obvious,” the
court said, that the police power did not authorize states to segregate facilities
to “preserve the public peace.”82 In a series of cases the Court outlawed
“separate but equal” golf courses,83 public parks,84 libraries,85 buses,86 airport
74. Id. at 301.
75. Id. at 300.
76. Id.
77. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
78. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
79. 347 U.S. at 493.
80. Id. at 494–95.
81. Dawson v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore City, 220 F.2d 386(4th Cir. 1955), aff’d,
350 U.S. 877 (1955) (holding segregation at public beaches unconstitutional).
82. Id. at 387.
83. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
84. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (per curiam),
aff’g, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958).
85. Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966).
86. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
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restaurants,87 municipal auditoriums,88 and courtrooms.89 As Robert L. Carter
wrote, “Brown thus extended to its natural consequences could mean that the
fetters binding the Negro were at last being struck, and that he would
henceforth be able to stretch himself to his full potential.”90 One area took
longer; the Court postponed ruling on antimiscegenation issues until 1967,91
having been persuaded to duck a challenge to Virginia’s law in 195592
apparently to avoid further inflaming Southern passions.
In other respects, Brown probably did not extend as far as its broad
language suggested. The Court stated that where a State operated a public
school system it created “a right which must be made available to all on equal
terms.”93 Yet if the Court meant in 1954 that all public schools in a State had
to be of equal quality, it never acted upon that vision. Indeed, two decades
later, in San Antonio v. Rodriguez94 the Court held that Equal Protection did
not mandate funding equity, a decision which Justice Thurgood Marshall
viewed as a departure from Brown.95
Ultimately, the issue before the Court in Brown and Bolling was whether
segregated public schools, even if equal in tangible factors, deprived minority
children of equal educational opportunities. The Court held that they did. Its
conclusion rested upon a rationale the Court stated in a single sentence. “To
separate them [African-American children] from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as
to their status in the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way
unlikely ever to be undone.”96
If the result—segregated public schools were illegal—was clear, the
rationale was subject to debate. Did Brown rest on the principle that
government could not use race as a basis for classifying? Alternatively, did the
opinion rest on a notion that government could not subordinate blacks to
whites?
Both ideas had impressive pedigrees. Indeed, Justice Harlan had deployed
the ideas side by side in his famous dissent in Plessy. There he wrote:
But in view of the Constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no
superior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here. Our

87. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
88. Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964).
89. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
90. Robert L. Carter, The Warren Court and Desegregation, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 237 (1968), in
THE WARREN COURT: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 47 (Richard H. Sayler et al. eds., 1968).
91. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
92. See Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
93. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
94. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
95. Id. at 71–72.
96. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494.
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Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among
citizens. In respect of civil rights, all citizens are equal before the law.97

Justice Harlan’s “no caste” idea suggested that the antisubjugation rationale
animated the clause. His color-blind constitution metaphor pointed to an
anticlassification norm. Moreover, in arguing Brown before the Court, the
NAACP had advanced both arguments. It argued, first, that Kansas lacked
power “to impose racial restrictions and distinctions.”98 Moreover, it claimed
that segregation harmed black children by stamping them as inferior.99
The Court did not need to choose between the anticlassification and
anticaste principles to decide Brown. In that case both roads led to the same
destination. Separate but equal classified based on race and reflected a belief
in the inferiority of blacks. Yet the issue had more than esoteric interest. It
affected the resolution of questions which later arose and dominated the
jurisprudence of much of the last third of the twentieth century. If Brown
rested on the anticlassification principle, other programs would be affected.
Could a school district use race to assign students in order to achieve
integration?
Was racial balancing an appropriate objective?
Would
affirmative action and other race conscious programs be inconsistent with a
principle that Thou Shalt Not Classify By Race? Alternatively, the
antisubjugation principle would allow government greater latitude to
distinguish between races to redress past injustices or achieve other
instrumental goals.
Both positions have had proponents on the Court. At the 1952 conference,
Justice William Douglas argued that “[n]o classification on the basis of race
can be made” under either the Equal Protection Clause or the Fifth
Amendment.100 More recently, Justices Scalia101 and Thomas102 have
embraced the anticlassification principle as the proper idea behind the Equal
Protection Clause. Others, such as Justices Thurgood Marshall103 and Harry
Blackmun104 endorsed the anticaste rationale.

97. 163 U.S. at 559.
98. Brief for Appellants at 6, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
99. Id. at 9.
100. DICKSON, supra note 13, at 652.
101. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Scalia, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) (“The Constitution proscribes government discrimination on the basis of
race . . .”).
102. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[S]egregation violated the Constitution because the State classified students based on their
race.”).
103. Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 396 (1978) (Marshall, J.)
(noting that the Fourteenth Amendment does not preclude use of racial classification to remedy
past discrimination).
104. Id. at 407 (“In order to get beyond racism, we must first take account of race.”).
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It is difficult to attribute the anticlassification idea to Brown. Brown did
not state that the Constitution precluded racial classification.105 Its failure to
articulate this principle is particularly significant because plaintiffs pushed this
argument in their brief. On the contrary, its key language addressed the effects
of segregation on black children.106 The Court wrote: “To separate them from
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”107
The implication was, of course, that segregation harmed black children
because it represented the majority’s message that they must be kept separate
because they were inferior. Brown rejected contrary language in Plessy, which
asserted that any inference that segregation “stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority” was not “by reason of anything found in [the Louisiana
law at issue in Plessy], but solely because the colored race chooses to put that
construction upon it.”108
Chief Justice Warren saw the subjugation issue as central to Brown. He
voiced this premise early in his opening remarks at the December 12, 1953,
conference. He told his new Brethren:
The more I read and hear and think, the more I come to conclude that the basis
of the principle of segregation and separate but equal rests upon the basic
premise that the Negro race is inferior. That is the only way to sustain
Plessy—I don’t see how it can be sustained on any other theory. If we are to
sustain segregation, we must do it on that basis. If oral argument proved
anything, the arguments of Negro counsel proved that they are not inferior.109

Chief Justice Warren made this point explicit in his opinion. The “question
presented,” wrote the Chief Justice, was whether school segregation deprived
“the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities[.]”110
The Court stated the problem in language which suggested antisubjugation, not
anticlassification, was its concern.
Moreover, the Court cited a finding in the Kansas case that “well stated”
the “effect of this separation” on the “educational opportunities” of black
children.
“Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental
effect upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the
105. See Reva B. Siegel, Symposium: Brown at Fifty: Equality Talk: Antisubordination and
Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1481
(2004).
106. See generally Charles R. Lawrence, III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:
Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987).
107. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
108. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).
109. DICKSON, supra note 13, at 654.
110. 347 U.S. at 493.
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sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually interpreted
as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A sense of inferiority affects the
motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of law, therefore,
has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a
racial[ly] integrated school system.”111

Indeed, in a recent article Professor Reva B. Siegel has argued that the
Court did not adopt the anticlassification idea for more than a decade after
Brown.112 Instead, it favored the antisubjugation norm, which pivoted on the
notion that segregation harmed blacks.113 Southerners contested this idea and
argued that integration, not segregation, harmed both races.114 Courts
embraced the anticlassification rationale as a way to insulate integration from
attack on the grounds that it harmed rather than helped.115 Even as courts
adopted the anticlassification norm “they understood that the purpose of equal
protection doctrine was to prevent the state from inflicting certain forms of
status harm on minorities.”116
Yet the issue is a bit murkier. In Bolling the Court included some language
which suggested that the anticlassification principle had a role: “Classifications
based solely upon race must be scrutinized with particular care, since they are
contrary to our traditions and hence constitutionally suspect.”117 The Court
may well have had an extraordinarily generous view of “our traditions”
because any reading of history would suggest that racial classifications had
been intrinsic to certain of our less noble traditions. But perhaps the Court
meant simply that those odious practices violated our aspirations and ideals
and in this sense violated the traditions we sought to establish. It went on to
quote language that the Constitution “forbids, so far as civil and political rights
are concerned, discrimination by the General Government, or by the States,
against any citizen because of his race.”118
How to reconcile that language with the different approach of Brown? It
seems unlikely the Court meant to apply a different test to federal and state
governments because Bolling quoted language that subjected them to a
common norm. Could the difference have been that the language on which the
111. Id. at 494.
112. See generally Siegel, supra note 105.
113. Id.
114. See id. at 1498–99.
115. See id. at 1499.
116. Id. at 1514; see also Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1. 33 (1959) (noting that Brown turned on antisubjugation principle);
Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L. J. 421, 421
(1960) (stating that the Equal Protection Clause forbids states from “significantly
disadvantag[ing]” blacks).
117. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
118. Id.
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Court relied in Bolling came from cases interpreting a Due Process Clause and
accordingly the Court felt uncomfortable applying the anticlassification
principle in Equal Protection cases? Different law clerks worked on the two
opinions.119 Yet the Court considered the opinions so thoroughly it seems
inconceivable that the fortuity of which clerk worked on which opinion
accounted for the difference. Ultimately, two points are worth making. First,
Brown was the lead opinion, the one which received the most attention and to
which most significance attached. Second, Bolling raised a modest version of
the anticlassification rationale. Bolling did not push anticlassification as far as
modern day proponents such as Justices Scalia and Thomas sometimes do.
Bolling did not preclude government from classifying based on race. It said
simply that such classifications “must be scrutinized with particular care” and
that they were “constitutionally suspect.”120 That requirement implied that
racial classifications were not per se unlawful. If they were, no careful
scrutiny would be needed. Identifying the classification would suffice to strike
it down. Indeed, in the lead case the Court cited for the point, Korematsu v.
United States, the Court had specifically noted that all racial classifications
Indeed, Korematsu had not
were not necessarily unconstitutional.121
scrutinized the racial classification with much care and upheld it as serving a
public necessity!122 To the extent that Bolling supports an anticlassification
principle, it is a qualified one.
Brown was also ambiguous as to what the Constitution required. Did
Brown simply outlaw segregation or did it require integration? The Briggs
court subsequently concluded that Brown did not require that “the states must
mix persons of different races in the schools.”123 Instead, it simply held that
states could not “deny to any person on account of race the right to attend any
school that it maintains.”124 Government could not segregate, but it need not
integrate. The difference was significant. Did Southern states need to simply
show they were not still separating the races, or did they need to present plans
creating racially mixed school populations? Although the Court ultimately
recognized a difference between de jure and de facto segregation, Del Dickson
reports that private Court documents suggest that in 1973 five justices thought
the distinction should be discarded.125
In retrospect, Brown stands for at least four basic constitutional ideals.
First, Brown celebrates education as a prerequisite to the American Dream.126
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

See SCHWARTZ, supra note 40 at 98.
Bolling, 347 U.S. at 499.
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
Id. at 223–24.
Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955).
Id.; see also WILKINSON, supra note 11, at 82.
DICKSON, supra note 13, at 680–81.
See, e.g., WILKINSON at 41 (“Schools were then the great hope.”).
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Brown recognized “the importance of education to our democratic society.”127
Education is “the very foundation of good citizenship.”128 It exposes a child to
cultural values, allows her to adjust to her environment, and prepares her for
professional training.129 A child cannot be expected to succeed if denied an
education.130 Accordingly, education was a “right” that had to be made
“available to all on equal terms.”131 Separate education was inherently unequal
because it meant that the American Dream could be reality for white, but not
black, children.
Second, Brown stands for the communitarian idea implicit in the
Constitution that we are one people. The preamble of the Constitution begins
with the words “We, the people.” Those words had not included blacks during
the long period when slavery was legal and Jim Crow constitutional. Brown
changed that. Plessy stood for the notion that America consisted of two
communities, white and black, who lived in separate neighborhoods, attended
different schools, rode in different railcars, and used different restaurants,
restrooms, and doors. Brown challenged that model. In implicitly rejecting
Plessy, Brown signifies that there is one America in which whites and blacks
are to be equal members.
Third, as suggested above, Brown endorses the antisubordination ideal as
the meaning of the Equal Protection Clause. Racial classification is offensive
because it casts blacks as lesser members of the community. Brown signifies
that blacks are equal members of America. Finally, Brown represents a
constitutional principle regarding how majorities should treat minorities. After
all, Brown notes the psychological harm segregation caused black children by
signifying their legal inferiority. Brown stands for the ideal that majorities
must structure society in a way that does not allow minorities to reasonably
conclude that they are lesser members of the political community. Brown
implicitly embraces the insight in the Carolene Products footnote four that
courts should carefully scrutinize classifications adverse to discrete and insular
minorities.132
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR CONSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT
A.

Brown

Brown affords an opportunity to engage students on the merits of different
styles of constitutional argument. Lawyers and judges typically employ

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.

Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Carolene Prod. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938).
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several modes of constitutional analysis in arguing about constitutional
interpretation. Although most would agree on a descriptive statement of the
six or seven types of argument typically used,133 there is less consensus
regarding the prescriptive or normative claims regarding what sorts of
arguments should receive emphasis. Whereas some emphasize textual
argument or intent of the framers as preferred methods of analysis, others
prefer doctrinal, structural, or moral or consequential argument.
Brown provides one lens through which to examine the relative merits of
these claims. As Professor (now Judge) Michael McConnell put it, “[s]uch is
the moral authority of Brown that if any particular theory does not produce the
conclusion that Brown was correctly decided, the theory is seriously
discredited.”134
The most familiar and comfortable modes of constitutional analysis would
not, in 1954, have produced the ruling Brown reached. The constitutional text
did not speak directly to school segregation. No constitutional language said
“no State shall provide segregated education for white and black children” or
words to that effect. The Constitution did prohibit a state from denying any
person equal protection of the laws, but, as a matter of abstract logic at least, it
was not clear that equal protection mandated integrated facilities. After all, no
one claims a constitutional violation when the state provides separate
restrooms for men and women. Why could not separate but equal schools
protect all equally? This consideration poses challenges for textualists. Did
textual argument support the position of the school boards in favor of separate
but equal? Was textual argument inconclusive? Or must the textual
requirement of equal protection be considered in some historical context rather
than as a matter of abstract logic?
Textual argument was even less helpful in Bolling v. Sharpe, which
considered whether Congress could maintain racially separate schools in the
District of Columbia. Clearly the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment did not limit federal action and other constitutional clauses spoke
to the issue remotely at best.
Nor was originalist argument very helpful. The Supreme Court had
directed the parties to brief whether the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
intended to ban racially segregated schools.135 That order, on its face,
suggested the Court gave credence to original intent. Presumably, if the
evidence had suggested that the framers of the Amendment intended to bar
133. See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1189 (1987); PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE
(1982); CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 14–38 (1969);
NORMAN REDLICH ET AL. UNDERSTANDING CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 6–20 (3d ed. 2005).
134. Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV.
947, 952 (1995).
135. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
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school segregation the Court would have so argued. Such a finding would
have eased the decision for those justices who were morally opposed to
segregation but were groping for a conventional legal argument to strike it
down. Some justices apparently expected the evidence to so point. The parties
submitted mountainous volumes of materials that drew upon some of the
foremost historians and legal scholars.136 Yet the Court concluded that
although the exhaustive discussion regarding original intent “cast some light”
it was insufficient to resolve the question because “[a]t best, [the sources] are
inconclusive.”137
The Court’s analysis highlighted two reasons why efforts to rely on
original intent are often unsuccessful. First, the record was inconclusive
because it failed to reveal a complete or consistent picture of the preferences of
those who drafted and ratified the Fourteenth Amendment.138 Second, the
record was inadequate because the problem the Court faced in 1954—was
separate but equal constitutional in public education?—was not a pressing
issue in the late 1860s. Public education was in its infancy and education of
blacks “was almost nonexistent.”139
In fact, the evidence regarding original intent may have been worse than
the Court suggested.
“The original understanding of the Fourteenth
Amendment plainly permitted school segregation[,]” wrote Michael Klarman
in his recent book on race in America.140 Most scholars who have studied this
question share Professor Klarman’s conclusion.141 Mark Tushnet, for instance,
points out that the Congress which proposed the Fourteenth Amendment
supported segregated schools in the District of Columbia.142 Proponents of the
Amendment routinely denied that it would lead to integrated schools.143 Five
northern states excluded black children from public schools altogether; eight
states allowed segregated schools.144 Michael McConnell, now a judge on the
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, reached a different conclusion. An
136. See KLUGER, supra note 11, at 620–59.
137. Brown, 347 U.S. at 489.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 490.
140. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 26 (2004).
141. See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 11, at 637; Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid
Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 800 (1983);
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 75
(1990) (“The opinion did not choose to face the uncomfortable fact that the effect on public
education was ignored because no one then imagined the equal protection clause might affect
school segregation.”). See generally WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(1988).
142. MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION FROM THE COURTS 156 (1999).
143. Id.
144. KLUGER, supra note 11, at 636–37.
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originalist, Judge McConnell argues that in a series of votes after the states
ratified the Fourteenth Amendment, a majority of Congress voted in favor of
school desegregation.145 Judge McConnell suggests that the congressional
support suggests that Brown is consistent with what the drafters intended.146
Professor Klarman has disputed this claim. He argues that most Americans
would not have agreed to a constitutional amendment in 1868 banning
segregated schools.147 He criticizes Judge McConnell’s emphasis on the
actions of drafters rather than ratifiers.148 And he argues that debates from
1872 to 1874 do not reflect intent several years earlier.149
Precedent, too, would not take the Court to the result it ultimately reached.
Plessy v. Ferguson had promulgated the doctrine of separate but equal fiftyeight years earlier.150 In Brown, the Court rather feebly distinguished it as
dealing with transportation rather than education.151 Yet Plessy had, as the
Court acknowledged, relied on an education case,152 had compared
transportation to education,153 and the Court had applied it in a half dozen
cases dealing with public education.154 Cases had demonstrated that equality
rarely followed from separation and had eroded somewhat the underpinnings
of a system which subordinated blacks. Yet Plessy remained part of the law of
the land in 1954.
Thus, conventional legal arguments could not readily produce the result the
Court needed to reach. The Court could not attribute its result either to the
framers of the Fourteenth Amendment or to the logic of the decisions of earlier
courts.155
The Court rejected the premise that history set the Constitution’s meaning.
Instead, the Court embraced a notion of a living Constitution. “[W]e cannot
145. McConnell, supra note 134, at 953.
146. Id.
147. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Originalism and Constitutional Theory: A Response to
Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 1881, 1884 (1995).
148. Id.
149. Id. But see Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Justification for Brown: A Reply to
Professor Klarman, 81 VA. L. REV. 1937 (1995).
150. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
151. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491(1954).
152. Roberts v. City of Boston, 59 Mass. (5 Cush.) 198, 206 (1850).
153. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544–45 (dicta stating racial segregation of schools constitutional).
154. Brown, 347 U.S. at 491–92.
155. Justice Jackson observed at conference on December 13, 1952:
I would start with these cases as a lawyer would. I find nothing in the text that says this is
unconstitutional. Nothing in the opinions of the courts say that it is unconstitutional.
Nothing in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment says that it is unconstitutional.
There is nothing in the acts of Congress either way. On the basis of precedents, I would
have to say that it is constitutional. Marshall’s brief starts and ends with sociology, not
legal issues.
DICKSON, supra note 13, at 652.
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turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was adopted, or even to
1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written.”156 Implicitly, the Court did not
think the Constitution’s meaning was fixed by the framers’ intent. Rather, it
must adapt to changing circumstances. Accordingly, the Court relied on less
conventional constitutional arguments. It made a sociological argument based
on empirical data measuring psychological harm on black children from
segregated schools. It cited, in its controversial footnote 11, the doll studies of
Dr. Kenneth Clark and other “modern authority.”157 Yet this data could only
be persuasive if it connected to a norm that held such psychological harm a
constitutional violation. As Professor Edmond Cahn argued, the data
confirmed what the justices already knew.158 Segregation sent a message
blacks were inferior, lesser members of the community. And that was wrong.
Ultimately, Brown was essentially a moral decision.159 The Court concluded
that school segregation was morally wrong because it imposed psychological
harm on black children.
But if Brown was a moral decision does that suggest that it rested simply
on the subjective ethics of the nine justices who decided it? That the decision
had no objective basis? And if so, what elevated Brown above Dred Scott v.
Sandford and Plessy v. Ferguson? Was the difference simply that Brown
strikes a contemporary audience as morally just whereas we regard the other
decisions as morally hideous?
The moral or political nature of the decision left Brown open to the charge
that the judiciary had usurped the role of the legislature, federal and state, and
had engaged in judicial legislation. The argument proceeded from two
different premises. To some extent the charge rests on a preference for modes
of constitutional argument which the Court avoided. Proponents of textualism
and originalism argue that those modes of argument constrain judicial choice.
By so doing, they inhibit judicial legislation and leave more issues to political
decision. Even precedent, a mode of argument to which committed textualists
and originalists generally assign less weight, forces judges to connect their
decisions to the work of prior jurists. Such claims are controversial. Should
the Court have adhered to the text, the framers’ specific intent and precedent
and have upheld separate but equal?
A second line of attack, however, suggested that Congress had authorized
Congress, not the Court, to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Section 5 of
the Amendment signaled an intent that Congress take the lead in vindicating

156. Brown, 347 U.S. at 492.
157. Id. at 494 & n.11.
158. Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 159 (1955); see also Wechsler,
supra note 116, at 33 (doubting case turned on psychological evidence).
159. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., IMPLEMENTING THE CONSTITUTION 8 (2001); Cahn,
supra note 158 at 158–59.
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the Amendment’s purpose. Of course, as Charles L. Black, Jr. pointed out,
there was “no contradiction, either logical or practical, in applying both
judicial and legislative power to the same end.”160 Moreover, Professor Black
pointed out, the argument was raised a little late, after many cases, including
Plessy, implicitly held the opposite.161 The objection that would effectively
convert the Equal Protection Clause into a political question would, of course,
radically transform constitutional law. If it is the province of the Court “to say
what the law is,”162 as Marbury proclaimed, removing Equal Protection from
its jurisdiction would change things quite a bit. In any event, the present
Court, which frequently asserts Marbury and has confined Congress’s power
under Section 5,163 although apparently not regarding race,164 seems to be
going in a different direction. Finally, would not reliance on Section 5 have
clashed with the philosophy expressed in Carolene Product’s footnote 4? The
national legislature, dominated as it was by Southerners who could veto
meaningful civil rights legislation, would preclude action regarding school
desegregation. Blacks, as the paradigmatic “discrete and insular minority”
would receive no relief from the political process. The Court, in stepping in,
acted in concert with that approach.
The appeal of some forms of interpretation reside in their claimed potential
to provide objective sources for constitutional outcomes. Thus, some argue
that textualism and originalism can constrain the discretion of unelected judges
who otherwise might write their own moral or policy preferences into
constitutional law. Regardless of the merits of these claims, they depend on
textualism or originalism being able to resolve pressing constitutional issues.
But what if, as in Brown, they are indeterminate? Or they produce a resolution
that is morally unacceptable?
A number of prominent scholars have rejected textualism and originalism
in demonstrating how a Brown opinion might have been drafted. Professor
John Hart Ely dismissed as irrelevant the quest “to guess what particular
instances of inequality our 1868 forebearers had at the forefront of their
minds.”165 Rather, the Equal Protection Clause is one of the Constitution’s
open textured provisions written to accommodate changing exigencies. The
Equal Protection Clause “is among the Constitution’s clearest examples of a

160. CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT: JUDICIAL REVIEW IN A
DEMOCRACY 139 (1960).
161. Id.
162. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
163. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. P.F. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2001).
164. See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 561 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
165. John Hart Ely, Concurring in the Judgment (except as to remedy), in BALKIN, supra note
6, at 135.
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provision whose exact content was understood not to be frozen in time.”166
Indeed, Professor Ely suggests that those who framed the Clause would have
expected their descendants to interpret it “in terms of the principles they set
forth” not based upon their specific preferences which did not find their way
into the constitutional text.167 Similarly, Professor Jack Balkin relied on a
mode of constitutional interpretation that rejects slavish adherence to the
framers’ particular preferences. He reasons that “the meaning of the American
The
Constitution evolves because the document is redemptive.”168
Constitution challenges each new generation “to live up to the promises and
ideals contained within it,” even if those who framed it had different
understandings.169 They follow Judge Louis Pollak who in 1959 wrote that the
history of the Fourteenth Amendment contemplated “an essentially dynamic
development by Congress and [the] Court of the liberties outlined in such
generalized terms in the Amendment.”170
Professor Archibald Cox argues that we should distinguish between the
specific intent of the framers regarding school desegregation and their broader
purpose.171 The former should not bind; the latter should have its influence.
Or as Alexander Bickel put it, a “two fold” analysis of congressional purpose
behind a constitutional amendment is needed. One inquiry should relate to
congressional understanding “of the immediate effect of the enactment on
conditions then present”; the other should address “what if any thought was
given to the long-range effect, under future circumstances, of provisions
necessarily intended for permanence.”172 The “proposition that all men are
born with equal right to human dignity and to equal standing in the eyes of
government regardless of the circumstances of their birth” not only inheres in
the Equal Protection Clause but “had been a basic American ideal since before
the Declaration of Independence.”173 Robert Bork, who essentially followed
Professor Bickel’s approach, argued that the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment thought that equality and segregation were compatible.
Subsequent history showed that “segregation rarely if ever produced
equality.”174 “The Court’s realistic choice” was between equality and

166. Id.
167. Id. at 135–36.
168. Jack M. Balkin, Rewriting Brown: A Guide to the Opinions, in BALKIN, supra note 6, at
54.
169. Id.
170. Louis H. Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 25 (1959).
171. ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 259–60 (1987).
172. Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69
HARV. L. REV. 1, 59 (1955).
173. Cox, supra note 171, at 259.
174. BORK, supra note 141, at 82.
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segregation, a decision which inevitably pointed towards equality.175 Thus,
according to Judge Bork, Brown was consistent with the original understanding
to the extent it emphasized equality.176
B.

Bolling v. Sharpe

Bolling offers other opportunity to explore issues regarding constitutional
interpretation. Unlike the other cases that arose in four different states, Bolling
considered whether segregated schools in the District of Columbia violated the
Constitution. The Equal Protection Clause addresses state, not federal, action;
it could not furnish the constitutional norm in Bolling as it did in Brown. As
such, Bolling posed different constitutional questions. Is there a reverse
incorporation doctrine such that the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause
incorporates the Equal Protection Clause?177 Can the Constitution state a
different constitutional norm for federal and state government?
The Court concluded that segregation in public schools in the District of
Columbia was unconstitutional. It rested its conclusion on two arguments.
First, “liberty” in the Due Process Clause required that government not restrict
human conduct “except for a proper governmental objective.”178 School
segregation was not “reasonably related” to such an objective and accordingly
was an arbitrary burden on the liberty of black children.179 Moreover, because
the Constitution bans states from maintaining racially segregated public
schools, “it would be unthinkable” for the Constitution to “impose a lesser duty
on the Federal Government.”180
This resolution might not satisfy all. A textualist might suggest that the
Constitution does not prevent the federal government from operating
segregated schools. For instance, Judge Bork argues that had Bolling “been
guided by the Constitution, it would have had to rule that it had no power to
strike down the District’s Laws.”181 The Equal Protection Clause may have
been thought necessary vis-a-vis the states because history cautioned that states
had proclivity to mistreat minorities. The absence of an Equal Protection
Clause binding the federal government might mean that the Constitution trusts
the national political process to handle such issues. An originalist might reach
the same conclusion.
Even if one accepted Judge McConnell’s argument that the framers of the
Equal Protection Clause intended to outlaw school segregation, it does not help
175. Id.
176. Id. at 81–82.
177. See, e.g., Cahn, supra note 158, at 154–55 (Court approaches position that equal
protection guarantee should be read into Fifth Amendment).
178. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954).
179. Id. at 500.
180. Id.
181. BORK, supra note 141, at 83.
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resolve the propriety of school desegregation in the nation’s capital. Quite
clearly, those who framed the Fifth Amendment did not intend to ban public
school segregation. Yet an originalist cannot comfortably conclude, as did the
Court, that “it would be unthinkable that the same Constitution would impose a
lesser duty on the Federal Government.”182 For quite clearly, those who
framed the Fifth Amendment did not mean to bar school segregation. Does the
Constitution allow the federal government to discriminate? The Court viewed
this prospect as “unthinkable.”183 As Michael Klarman observes, “[w]hat
Frankfurter found compelling was the moral, not the legal, argument against
segregation in the nation’s capital.”184 Yet this resolution turns on “morality
and. . . politics,”185 argues Judge Bork. The Court has left other issues to the
political process; why not this one, too?
One might accept the Court’s resolution that views the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause as having a substantive, as well as procedural, mission.
Liberty might include freedom to attend desegregated schools, and such liberty
could not be arbitrarily denied. Yet if the Due Process Clause in the Fifth
Amendment was capable of outlawing racial segregation in schools,
presumably the Due Process Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment would be as
well. What then is the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause, why was it
included, and why did the Court rely on it in Brown?
The equality norm might be traced to the Declaration of Independence,
which declared the “self-evident truth” that “all men are created equal.”
Perhaps that ideal was made applicable against the federal government by the
Ninth Amendment, which made clear that the enumeration of certain
constitutional rights was not meant to negate the existence of others.186 Yet the
equality norm which the Declaration announced did not render slavery
unconstitutional. And if it was sufficient to preclude the federal government
from operating segregated schools why was it also not robust enough to
restrain the states without the need to ratify the Equal Protection Clause?
Alternatively, one might identify precedent as applying such a requirement
on the federal government. Indeed, in Korematsu v. United States,187 ten years
before Brown, the Court applied an equal protection norm against the federal
government. Perhaps Korematsu provided a precedential argument that the
norm limited Congress. Indeed, in Bolling the Court did cite Korematsu
regarding the need to scrutinize racial classifications closely. It might have
182. Bolling, 347 U.S. at 500.
183. Interestingly, Justice Frankfurter initially found it easier to resolve Bolling than Brown.
When the conference discussed the cases in December, 1952, he opined that allowing school
segregation in the nation’s capital was “intolerable.” DICKSON, supra note 13, at 649–51.
184. KLARMAN, supra note 140, at 295.
185. BORK, supra note 141, at 83.
186. See, e.g., Ely, in BALKIN, supra note 165, at 141 n.10.
187. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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cited it for the related point that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment restricted Congress’s ability to discriminate based on race. Of
course, Korematsu ultimately found that the military internment of Japanese
American citizens did not violate the constitutional norm at issue. It has
become a much maligned decision. Should such an important point rest simply
on the implicit reliance on such a disfavored case?
Although the Equal Protection Clause only applies to states, the
Citizenship Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment is not so limited. Rather, it
established a national standard of citizenship, making all persons born or
naturalized in the United States citizens of the United States and their states of
residence. The Citizenship Clause might provide a basis for concluding that
the federal government would not treat some as lesser citizens than others.188
Yet the same argument would also seem to apply to the states, too. If so, what
was the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause? Moreover, Professor Frank
Michelman has argued that the Citizenship Clause may have given AfricanAmericans rights previously enjoyed by whites, but it does not describe what
rights those were.189 If the Constitution did not previously outlaw racial
separation, the Citizenship Clause could not convey such a right.190
IV. DID BROWN MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
Brown has achieved iconic status in American constitutional law. It “may
be the most important political, social, and legal event in America’s twentiethcentury history,”191 wrote J. Harvie Wilkinson, III in 1979. Professor (now
Judge) Wilkinson’s statement regarding Brown’s significance can easily be
multiplied many times over. The sheer number of celebrations of Brown to
mark its fiftieth anniversary (not to mention those that marked May 17 on prior
five-year intervals) testify to the special place it holds. To many, Brown
confirmed that an activist Court could overcome political inertia to achieve
justice and social change.192 But how much difference did Brown really make?
Was Brown’s success (or failure) due to the nature of the problem it addressed
or the manner in which it dealt with it? Or does the verdict on Brown reveal
strengths (or weaknesses) of the judiciary?
Some scholars have argued that Brown made little difference in
transforming race relations during the mid-twentieth century. “The history of
the campaign against racial injustice since 1954, when the Supreme Court

188. See, e.g., Drew S. Days, III, Concurring, in BALKIN, supra note 6, at 97–98; Bruce
Ackermann, Concurring, in BALKIN, supra note 6, at 114–16.
189. Frank I. Michelman, Concurring in Part and Concurring in the Judgment, in BALKIN,
supra note 6, at 129–30.
190. Id.
191. WILKINSON, supra note 11, at 6.
192. See, e.g., Balkin, in BALKIN, supra note 6, at 16–17.
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decided Brown v. Board of Education, is a history in large part of failure,”193
wrote Ronald Dworkin in 1985.
Because Brown addressed segregation in public education, the public
schools are one place to look to measure its impact. In the 1954-55 school
year, only .001% of Southern black children went to public schools with
whites.194 Nine years later, the figure had risen to only 1.2%195 Most of the
increase occurred in Texas and Tennessee.196 More than 2000 school districts
still maintained racially segregated schools a decade after Brown.197
As Professor Gerald Rosenberg has argued, in the South “[f]or ten years,
1954–64, virtually nothing happened.”198 The picture changed during the next
decade. Whereas 1.2% of southern black children attended integrated public
schools in 1963–64, 91.3% did in 1972–73.199
What accounts for the difference? In 1964 Congress passed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.200 It empowered the Attorney General to initiate school
desegregation suits on behalf of individuals, a significant development since
plaintiffs often suffered severe personal and economic injury. Title VI
empowered the federal government to withdraw federal funds from public
schools that practiced racial discrimination. The Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965201 appropriated substantial sums of federal assistance to
low income school districts. Federal regulations that HEW promulgated to
supplement Title VI required schools desegregate to preserve their funding.202
This data suggests several lessons. First, school desegregation did not
occur simply because the Court rejected separate but equal. By 1966–67, less
than 17% of Southern blacks attended integrated schools.203 Put differently,
most Southern children who entered school the fall after the Court decided
Brown experienced segregated education through graduation.

193. RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 298 (1985).
194. GERALD ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING SOCIAL CHANGE 50
(1991).
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Civil Rights, Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
88th Cong. 1st Sess. 1509 (1963) (testimony of Anthony J. Celebrezze, Sec’y of Health, Educ.,
and Welfare).
198. ROSENBERG, supra note 194 at 52 (emphasis omitted). Rosenberg notes that in the
border states the picture was quite different. Blacks attending integrated public schools rose
15.2% from 1956 to 1964 and 28.1% excluding the District of Columbia. Id. at 50.
199. Id. at 52.
200. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
201. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27 (1965).
202. See generally ROSENBERG, supra note 194 at 52–54.
203. Id. at 50.
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Second, change occurred only after the political branches became engaged.
During the 1950s, President Dwight Eisenhower did little to support Brown.204
At his press conference two days after the decision, he declined to give the
South guidance and simply stated that “[t]he Supreme Court has spoken and I
am sworn to uphold the constitutional processes in this country; and I will
obey.”205 Eisenhower’s endorsement of the decision would have lent it the
imprimatur of his prestige as President and as a national hero. As Civil Rights
Leader Roy Wilkins put it, if Eisenhower “‘had fought World War II the way
he fought for civil rights, we would all be speaking German today.’”206
Although President John F. Kennedy supported Brown he did not become fully
engaged until June of 1963.207 In the aftermath of Birmingham, when police
turned fire hoses and dogs on peaceful black demonstrators, Kennedy gave an
eloquent televised address supporting integration and introduced Civil Rights
legislation.208 Congress took no meaningful action to support Brown until
1964 when it passed the Civil Rights Act.209 In the 1950s, Congress was
stymied by Southern resistance. In March of 1956, some 100 Senators and
Representatives signed the Southern Manifesto attacking Brown as lawless and
pledging to take action to achieve its reversal and to prevent its
implementation.210 Brown, Professor Rosenberg argues, suggests the limited
impact courts can have in transforming society.211
Finally, after Brown the Court itself retreated. Its decision the following
year in Brown II called for the defendant school boards to “make a prompt and
reasonable start toward full compliance” and called on District Courts to move
with “all deliberate speed.”212 The adjectives suggested integration need not
occur immediately. Many communities responded with resistance.213 As
Richard Kluger observed, “[t]hroughout the balance of the Fifties, the South
interpreted ‘all deliberate speed’ to mean ‘any conceivable delay,’ and
desegregation was far more a figment in the mind of the Supreme Court than a

204. See, e.g., id. at 75 (“[Eisenhower] steadfastly refused to commit his immense popularity
or prestige in support of desegregation in general or Brown in particular.”); KLUGER, supra note
11 at 755.
205. The President’s News Conference of May 19, 1954, 1954 PUB. PAPERS 489, 491 (May
19, 1954).
206. Quoted in ROSENBERG, supra note 194 at 76.
207. See MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 178–82 (2000).
208. Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights, 1963 PUB. PAPERS
468 (June 11, 1963).
209. See ROSENBERG, supra note 194 at 46–47.
210. 102 CONG. REC. 4515 (1956).
211. ROSENBERG, supra note 194 at 70–71.
212. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300, 301 (1955).
213. See, e.g., Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 432–33 (1968).
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prominent new feature on the American social landscape.”214 Although the
Court in Cooper v. Aaron held that violence and disorder was not a basis to
defer enforcement of Brown,215 the Court did not decide another school
desegregation case until 1963. Only after the political branches became
involved in the mid-1960s, did the Court aggressively return to the fray. In
Green v. County School Board it ordered school boards to immediately offer
realistic plans to completely remove state imposed segregation “root and
branch.”216 The following year, the Court directed that “the obligation of
every school district is to terminate dual school systems at once and to operate
now and hereafter only unitary schools.”217
Other scholars have joined Professor Rosenberg in challenging the heroic
account of Brown. Professor Michael Klarman argues that Brown’s direct
effects were limited. Outside of the South, some desegregation began before
Brown. In the South, change did not begin for a decade. After Brown,
Southern politics polarized, becoming more racial. Southern school boards
became intransigent. Desegregation depended on plaintiffs initiating lawsuits,
and few were willing or financially able to assume that role with the attendant
economic and personal risks. When desegregation occurred, it was due to the
Civil Rights Movement and the 1964 Act, not to Brown. Professor Klarman
suggests that Brown’s most significant effect was an indirect one. The
decision radicalized southern politics. The violent and extremist nature of
white supremacy came to the surface in response to the decision. Its exposure
transformed national opinion on race, making possible the political support for
the 1964 Act.218
Some suggest that in Brown a Northern majority imposed its will on a
Southern minority.219 Does the presence of three Southerners on the Court—
Hugo Black, Tom Clark and Stanley Reed—soften this account? Moreover,
Brown included cases in Kansas and Delaware (not to mention the District of
Columbia), hardly the deep South. Yet notwithstanding its words,220 the Court
seemed to conceive of the problem as an issue for the South, where segregation
was overt, rather than for the rest of the country where it stemmed in part from
residential patterns.

214. RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 752–53 (1975).
215. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
216. 391 U.S. at 437–38.
217. Alexander v. Holmes County Bd. of Educ., 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (citations omitted).
218. KLARMAN, supra note 140 at 344–442.
219. See, e.g., TUSHNET, supra note 142 at 145; POWE, supra note 5 at 23.
220. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 491 n.6 (“It is apparent that such segregation has
long been a nationwide problem, not merely one of sectional concern.”).
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Alternatively, Professor Derrick Bell argues that Brown reflects his
“interest-convergence” thesis.221 Professor Bell does not see Brown as a
moment when America came to grips with its racist history. In essence, he
argued that the Court protects the interests of African-Americans when their
interests converge with those of whites,222 particularly elite whites. In part,
Professor Bell bases his theory on the argument that in the 1950s school
segregation had become an embarrassment to America in prosecuting the Cold
War.223 The Soviet Union was able to exploit America’s racial problems with
third-world countries. Professor Mary Dudziak has also argued that the “Cold
War imperative” contributed to Brown.224 Professor Dudziak notes that
“promot[ing] democracy among peoples of color around the world was
seriously hampered by continuing racial injustice at home.”225 Indeed,
NAACP and government briefs in Brown argued that segregation jeopardized
America’s international interests.226 Surely America’s racial problems did
provide the Soviets an easy way to score propaganda points in the third world.
Yet interestingly, this Cold War imperative did not move President
Eisenhower, who had a primary constitutional responsibility in the Cold War,
to champion Brown. If Brown had much significance in the success of the
Cold War, the paramount issue of the day, why was Eisenhower not a more
forceful advocate for integration? Nor did the Court argue in Brown that
desegregation would help combat communism, an argument that might have
carried weight in the South.
Did the Court miss the mark because it misconstrued the problems under
attack in Brown? Robert L. Carter has stated that in 1954 he, like others, “saw
the dual school system as the key barrier to equal educational opportunity for
African-Americans.”227 Looking back forty years later, he thought his faith
“naive.”228 Indeed, by 1968, he already had come to conceive the problem
differently. “Few in the country, black or white, understood in 1954 that racial
segregation was merely a symptom, not the disease; that the real sickness is
that our society in all of its manifestations is geared to the maintenance of
white superiority.”229
221. See Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
222. Id. at 518; see also DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM 4 (2004) [hereinafter SILENT
COVENANTS].
223. SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 222 at 60.
224. See DUDZIAK, supra note 207.
225. Id. at 12.
226. Id. at 99.
227. Robert L. Carter, Public School Desegregation: A Contemporary Analysis, 37 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 885, 885 (1993).
228. Id.
229. Carter, supra note 90 at 56.
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Professor Mark Tushnet has suggested that we should distinguish between
the short-term and long-term effects of the Court’s decisions. Brown “was so
widely disregarded in the deep South” that it was a “long-term irrelevancy”
(measured over its first decade).230 If the chronological measure is stretched to
a generation, Brown successfully “eliminat[ed] legally sanctioned explicit
racial school segregation.”231 The findings of Professors Rosenberg and
Klarman show that congressional and executive action was needed to integrate
southern schools.
Notwithstanding its limitations, Brown represented a constitutional
principle against discrimination against blacks that was applied in other
contexts. It was, in Robert L. Carter’s words, “a revolutionary statement of
race relations law.”232 During the debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
for instance, many legislators invoked Brown as the law of the land. The task
of proponents of the Act would have been complicated had the Court
reaffirmed Plessy v. Ferguson. Clearly, as Professor Tushnet argues, there was
value in “the public assertion by the nation’s highest court of a principle,
arguably with large-scale though long-term effects on public opinion about
race.”233 It signaled to the nation “that one of its major institutions took the
claims of African-Americans to equal treatment seriously.”234 As Professor
Bickel put it, “announcement of the principle was in itself an action of great
moment, considering the source from which it came.”235 Brown no doubt
played an important part in winning acceptance by whites of the principles for
which it stood. As the ruling of a unanimous Supreme Court, it represented the
first time a branch of our federal government embraced the general principles
that states must treat blacks equally.236 Brown, as Richard Kluger put it,
“represented nothing short of a reconsecration of American ideals.”237
Finally, outside the South, Brown did have some positive short-term
effects on schools. The decision triggered much school desegregation in
border states and in the North.238

230. TUSHNET, supra note 142 at 135–36.
231. Id. at 136.
232. Carter, supra note 90 at 237.
233. TUSHNET, supra note 142 at 136.
234. Id.
235. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 245 (1962).
236. See Mark Tushnet, The Significance of Brown v. Board of Education, 80 VA. L. REV.
173, 177 n.16 (1994).
237. KLUGER, supra note 11 at 713.
238. ROSENBERG, supra note 194 at 50.
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V. BROWN AND THE NATURE OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Brown made the Equal Protection Clause an instrument to protect
minorities. As late as 1927 Justice Holmes had derided the Clause as the
“usual last resort of constitutional arguments.”239
Although the Court occasionally invoked the Clause240 prior to Brown it
“was not a strong element in the Supreme Court’s arsenal.”241 Brown changed
that. In a series of cases, after Brown, the Court used the Equal Protection
Clause to strike down segregation in public auditoriums,242 beaches,243 golf
courses,244 sporting events,245 public restaurants,246 buses,247 jails,248 and
courtrooms.249 So, too, the Court ultimately used the Clause to strike down
antimiscegenation statutes.250
The reinvigoration of the Equal Protection Clause was not limited to racial
discrimination. Brown served as a model for other groups to claim protected
status. Women,251 aliens,252 the mentally retarded,253 children born out of
wedlock,254 and gays and lesbians255 used Brown as a paradigm in claiming
protected status under the Equal Protection Clause.
Brown also inaugurated a proliferation of “rights consciousness” among
Americans.256 Constitutional rights were not asserted simply by various
groups claiming protected status under the Equal Protection Clause. Others
made novel claims regarding rights they viewed as fundamental. “Brown was
the first case in which the Supreme Court struck down numerous laws of many
states in order to protect individual civil, as distinguished from economic,
239. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 208 (1927).
240. See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
241. PHILIP B. KURLAND, POLITICS THE CONSTITUTION AND THE WARREN COURT 110
(1970).
242. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass’n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
243. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
244. Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
245. State Athletic Comm’n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959).
246. Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962).
247. Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896)).
248. Lee v. Washington, 390 U.S. 333 (1968).
249. Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
250. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
251. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 44 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
252. See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973).
253. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
254. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
255. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
256. Mark Tushnet & Katya Lezin, What Really Happened in Brown v. Board of Education,
91 COLUM. L. REV. 1867 (1991); see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 7 (1970) (“Brown . . . was the beginning.”).
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rights,”257 wrote Professor William E. Nelson. Due to Brown, Professor
Nelson wrote, “Americans of all groups . . . have grown to understand that they
have rights and that those rights can be enforced through law.”258 As such,
Brown became the model that other disadvantaged groups used to assert their
own rights. Women, gays, even whites used Brown to justify their own claims
for better constitutional treatment.
The proliferation of constitutional rights relates to another change
identified with Brown—the enhanced role of the Supreme Court. Brown put
the Court in the midst of the nation’s most pressing domestic problems.
Whereas the post New Deal Court had essentially given Congress a wide berth
regarding economic legislation, Brown marked the beginning of the Court’s
embrace of the logic of Justice Stone’s famous Carolene Products footnote
four. Yet the Court did not limit itself to protecting discrete and insular
minorities and keeping the democratic processes open as Justice Stone’s
footnote prescribed. It also assumed a broader, more ambitious role in
articulating and defining constitutional norms in areas like criminal justice and
privacy.
The Court’s work impacted the shape and operation of American
government at the national and local level. The new constitutional norms that
the post-Brown Court articulated constrained federal and state political
institutions. Legislative and executive bodies needed to conform their conduct
to accommodate the Court’s constitutional interpretations. Moreover, the
Court’s intervention resulted in part from Congress’s failure to act. Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment empowered Congress to address school
segregation. As Justice Jackson put it during oral argument, “‘I suppose that
realistically the reason this case is here is that action couldn’t be obtained from
Congress.’”259
In a recent article, Professor Nelson also claims that Brown changed the
way in which Americans think about law. In essence, prior to Brown “legal
thinkers tended to see law as a caboose and the judge as someone who tidied
up and ensured that law was following in the direction society was leading.”260
After Brown “we now tend to look upon law more as the engine that will
dictate the course society will take.”261 The old approach was “progressive,
although never radical.”262 The new orientation could accommodate radical
but also reactionary dispositions.263
257. William E. Nelson, Brown v. Board of Education and the Jurisprudence of Legal
Realism, 48 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 795, 797 (2004).
258. Id.
259. Quoted in BICKEL, supra note 256, at 7.
260. Nelson, supra note 257, at 799.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 832.
263. Id.
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VI. WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID
Much of the controversy regarding Brown relates to what it said or failed
to say rather than to the result it reached. Put differently, most cannot imagine
living in a society in which Brown was not law. But many would have written
the opinion differently than the Court did. As such, the case provides an
opportunity for students to consider how the opinion should have been crafted.
Of course, this consideration turns on legal principles as well as political
realities. The Court needed to anticipate the likely response to its decision and
opinion and calculate how to achieve a favorable outcome. Here, of course,
hindsight confers on modern would-be jurists a perspective and advantage
Chief Justice Warren lacked.
Some praised Chief Justice Warren’s opinion. Professor Edmond Cahn
thought his style “most commendably bland.”264 Warren was very wise to
avoid the “temptation—to indulge in democratic rhetoric” and to subordinate
“getting into the anthologies [to] presenting the country with a model of
rational calm.”265 Others suggest the Court should have elevated its rhetoric.
J. Harvie Wilkinson, III observes that “the Court refused to lift the nation to
the magnificence of the principle it . . . redeemed. . . . In short, the opinion
failed to rouse or inspire; it simply existed.”266
The Court, in Brown, sought to “persuad[e] the persuadable southerner.”267
To pursue this objective, Chief Justice Warren wrote a short opinion in which
he consciously pulled his punches to avoid accusatory rhetoric that might
inflame the South. Yet in this respect, Professor Powe argues Brown was “a
failure.”268 The opinion could only persuade those capable of persuasion if it
argued that desegregation would help, not harm, them. Professor Powe
suggests that by relying on psychology the Court sacrificed its claim to
expertise; after all, the justices were presumably constitutional, not
psychological, wizards.269 Moreover, he suggests that the Court missed a
persuasive argument regarding the general intent of the Fourteenth
Amendment.270 Its framers favored equality but also assumed that segregation
was consistent with it. Yet American history had proved that separate but
equal was an oxymoron regarding race. The overriding purpose of the clause
should dominate the specific, but inconsistent, preferences of some framers.271

264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Cahn, supra note 158, at 151.
Id.
WILKINSON, supra note 11, at 29.
POWE, supra note 5, at 39.
Id. at 40.
Id.
Id. at 40–41.
Id.
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Professor (now Judge) Louis Pollak provided an alternative draft of the
Court’s opinion on its fifth anniversary. Professor Pollak recognized that
Plessy applied to schools but thought the Court was obligated to reexamine
“grave constitutional questions in a proper case” especially “when the
constitutional provisions at issue are themselves of an evolutionary
generality.”272 The Court need not engage psychological offerings because
legislation “curtail[ing] the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately
suspect.”273 Jim Crow laws degraded blacks and that was their function.
“Such governmental denigration is a form of injury the Constitution recognizes
and will protect against.”274
Professor Jack Balkin recently invited eight leading constitutional law
scholars to join him on a mock court to rewrite Brown. Whereas Chief Justice
Earl Warren’s eight colleagues silently joined his opinion, Professor Balkin’s
opinion was joined only by his two colleagues at Yale Law School, Professor
Bruce Ackerman and Professor Drew Days, III. Five others concurred in the
judgment but for different reasons.
Should Brown, for instance, have overruled Plessy v. Ferguson rather than
simply concluding that separate but equal had no place in public education?
Whereas Professor Days argues that Plessy should have been overruled
outright,275 Professor Cass Sunstein’s adherence to judicial minimalism leads
him to follow Chief Justice Warren’s course in limiting his rejection of the
doctrine to public education.276 Professor Derrick Bell, however, argued that
overruling Plessy would be a charade. Whites would continue to resist equality
for blacks. Better to preserve Plessy but press for truly equal schools.277
Chief Justice Warren tried to avoid condemning the South in his opinion.
Rather than documenting the inhumane mistreatment of African-Americans, he
argued simply that segregated education based on race “generates a feeling of
inferiority” in black children which compromised their ability to learn.278 The
Court, in its famous footnote eleven, relied on Dr. Kenneth C. Clark’s doll
study and Gunner Myrdal’s book, The American Dilemma. Yet Dr. Clark’s
work was controversial—although Southern black children preferred a white to
a black doll, so, too, did black children in the North where de jure school

272. Pollak, supra note 170, at 25–26.
273. Id. at 27.
274. Id. at 28.
275. See Days, in BALKIN, supra note 6, at 95–96 (“There is, in my estimation, no
justification for judicial timidity in this regard. For we know as men and women that until the
Plessy doctrine is eliminated ‘root and branch,’ true progress in achieving racial equality will be
significantly frustrated and retarded.”).
276. Cass R. Sunstein, Concurring in the judgment, in BALKIN, supra note 6, at 181.
277. Derrick A. Bell, Dissenting, in BALKIN, supra note 6, at 198–99; see also SILENT
COVENANTS, supra note 222, at 21–28.
278. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1953).
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segregation was not prevalent. Should the Court have relied on social science
showing psychological harm? Many believe that the reliance on psychological
studies was a mistake.279 The doll study used a small sample and the data did
not uniformly point to segregation as the source of psychological harm.
Moreover, if equal protection turns on psychological proof, segregation could
be reinstituted if such proof were absent.280 Further, Southerners were able to
turn Brown’s wording around and claim that they were victims suffering
psychological harm from the Court’s interference with their traditional way of
life.281 Justice Clarence Thomas viewed the psychological study as irrelevant.
He wrote:
Segregation was not unconstitutional because it might have caused
psychological feelings of inferiority. Public school systems that separated
blacks and provided them with superior educational resources—making blacks
“feel” superior to whites sent to lesser schools—would violate the Fourteenth
Amendment, whether or not the white students felt stigmatized, just as do
school systems in which the positions of the races are reversed. Psychological
injury or benefit is irrelevant to the question whether state actors have engaged
in intentional discrimination—the critical inquiry for ascertaining violations of
the Equal Protection Clause. The judiciary is fully competent to make
independent determinations concerning the existence of state action without
the unnecessary and misleading assistance of the social sciences.282

Alternatively, should Brown have emphasized legal principles? Professor
Days, for instance, draws from Hirabayashi v. United States283 the principle
that racial or ancestral distinctions between citizens “‘are by their very nature
odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine of
equality.’”284 Judge Pollak invoked a similar principle in his 1959 article,
condemning governmental action abridging the civil rights of one racial
group.285 Discussion earlier suggests some alternative lines which the Court
might have pursued.
VII. SUPREME COURT POLITICS
Brown provides a fascinating window into the decision-making process of
the Court, an institution whose deliberations generally remain inscrutable to all

279. See, e.g., Mark G.Yudof, School Desegregation: Legal Realism, Reasoned Elaboration,
and Social Science Research in the Supreme Court, 42 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 70 (1978);
Cahn, supra note 158, at 159–68; POWE, supra note 5, at 41–44.
280. Cf. Cahn, supra note 158, at 167–68.
281. See generally Rachel E. Goldstein, The Strife for Inequality: Victimization and Brown v.
Board of Education (unpublished paper, on file with Princeton University).
282. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70, 121 (Thomas, J., concurring).
283. 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
284. Days, in BALKIN, supra note 6, at 97 (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 100).
285. See generally Pollak, supra note 170.
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but Court insiders. Several excellent accounts shed light on how the Court
reached its unanimous result.286 The episode provides a case study in judicial
leadership as exemplified by Chief Justice Warren. It also illustrates the way
in which justices must accommodate their colleagues’ dispositions to serve
institutional goals.
The Court was, of course, split when it first heard the cases in 1952. Some
estimate that four or perhaps five justices would have voted to sustain Plessy.
Klarman concludes that four justices—Black, Douglas, Burton and Minton—
were prepared to vote that segregation was unconstitutional in 1952, that
Vinson and Reed were disposed to affirm Plessy, and the others were
uncertain.287 His analysis is generally consistent with Justice Douglas’
memorandum of May 17, 1954.288 Justice Frankfurter thought a vote in
December 1952 would have invalidated segregation, 5-4 (with Frankfurter
joining the majority) but in several opinions.289
Chief Justice Fred Vinson had little influence with his colleagues; Bernard
Schwartz has written that when Brown came to the Court, “the Brethren were
openly to display their contempt for their Chief.”290 As a stalling tactic, Justice
Felix Frankfurter persuaded his colleagues to direct the parties to file
additional briefs, on the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment
and regarding remedial matters. Yet more argument would not necessarily
resolve the split on the Court. And some, like Justice Frankfurter, thought a
unanimous decision necessary to mitigate Southern resistance. On September
8, 1953, fate intervened. Vinson died. Justice Frankfurter told an associate,
“‘This is the first indication I have ever had that there is a God.’”291
Eisenhower’s appointment of Chief Justice Earl Warren offered an
opportunity for the Court to resolve Brown. Eisenhower certainly did not have
this result in mind. He did not apply a litmus test for appointment to the Court.
Indeed, he did nothing to advance the plaintiffs’ case. While Brown was
before the Court, Eisenhower invited Warren to a White House dinner and
seated him next to John W. Davis, the attorney for South Carolina.
Eisenhower praised Davis effusively and told Warren: “‘These [Southerners]
are not bad people. All they are concerned about is to see that their sweet little
girls are not required to sit in school alongside some big black bucks.’”292

286. See, e.g., Tushnet & Lezin, supra note 256, at 1867; Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity
and Desegregation: Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948–1958, 68 GEO. L.J. 1 (1979);
KLARMAN, supra note 140, at 301–303; KLUGER, supra note 11, at 585–619, 660–702. See
generally DICKSON, supra note 13, at 644–71.
287. KLARMAN, supra note 140, at 298.
288. DICKSON, supra note 13, at 660.
289. KLARMAN, supra note 140, at 301.
290. SCHWARTZ, supra note 40, at 73.
291. KLUGER, supra note 11, at 659; SCHWARTZ, supra note 40, at 72.
292. SCHWARTZ, supra note 40, at 112–13.
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Warren brought at least three resources to his job which helped move
Brown to a unanimous decision. First, he lacked the baggage that
compromised his predecessor’s ability to lead the Court.293 On the contrary,
many on the Court were predisposed toward Warren.294 In the early days of
his tenure, all of his colleagues sought to win his favor. Second, he had
enormous leadership skills. Finally, Chief Justice Warren was to become a
strong advocate of the position the Court adopted in Brown.
Chief Justice Warren’s statement at the December 12, 1953 conference
struck two notes that resonated with the Brethren and set the tone for the
course followed. First, he cast Brown as a moral issue that “went straight to
the ultimate human values involved.”295 Plessy’s separate but equal doctrine,
said Warren, rested “upon the basic premise that the Negro race is inferior,”296
a notion Warren rejected. As such, Warren moved the discussion from
conventional legal arguments, where plaintiffs’ case was more challenging, to
a moral plane where it was compelling. Second, Chief Justice Warren
indicated a sensitivity to Southern sensibilities. He recognized that “the time
element” was important, that Court action should be done “in a tolerant way,”
a sentiment he repeated.297
Chief Justice Warren’s statement eliminated any doubt regarding the
outcome. His made five clear votes to overturn segregation. Others on the
Court felt pressure to make the decision unanimous to help avert resistance.
Moreover, Professor Klarman suggests that Warren’s stance reduced the
bargaining power of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson and may have induced
them to subordinate their legal doubts to their political and moral
preferences.298 By the end of the conference, Professor Schwartz concludes
plaintiffs had at least six votes (Warren, Black, Frankfurter, Douglas, Burton
and Minton) and two others (Jackson and Clark) were within reach depending
on the opinion written.299 Warren regularly spoke with his colleagues and
frequently lunched with the lone holdout, Justice Stanley Reed, and those most
likely to influence him. Although Reed initially planned to dissent, Warren
apparently persuaded him over time that a dissent would not be “the best thing
for the [C]ountry.”300 The Court anticipated a hostile response from some
circles and thought a unanimous result would mitigate that reaction. “It was
necessary, therefore, if ever it had been, to exert to the utmost the prestige, the
oracular authority of the institution,” wrote Alexander Bickel, law clerk to
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Id. at 72–75.
See KLUGER, supra note 11, at 660–61.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 40, at 87.
DICKSON, supra note 13, at 654.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 40, at 87–89.
KLARMAN, supra note 140, at 302–03.
SCHWARTZ, supra note 40, at 89.
Id. at 94.
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Justice Frankfurter during the 1953–54 term.301 “To this end, it was desirable
that the Court speak unanimously, with one voice from the deep.”302
The opinion reflected some of these strategic decisions. Warren assigned
the opinion to himself, a choice which signified the importance of the case and
allowed him to control its content. The opinion was unusually short and
written in an accessible style. It avoided condemnatory language, focused
narrowly on education, and provided little in the way of rationale. These
features probably helped secure the unanimous result behind a single opinion.
Although Justice Jackson considered writing a concurrence, a March 30, 1954,
heart attack hospitalized him.
VIII. THE REMEDY
In virtually all cases, the Supreme Court announces a remedy in the same
opinion that addresses the merits. Brown was different. The Court deferred a
decree. The “variety of local conditions” made formulating decrees “problems
of considerable complexity.”303 The Court instead asked the parties to present
yet more argument on Questions 4 and 5304 from its order of June 8, 1953.305
Moreover, the Court invited the Attorney General to participate and allowed
Amicus briefs by attorneys general from states allowing or requiring
segregated schools.306 The Court’s ultimate decree did not issue for more than
a year, a delay due in part to the death of Justice Jackson and appointment of
Judge John Harlan to succeed him.

301. Bickel, supra note 172 at 2.
302. Id.
303. 347 U.S. at 495.
304. Id. at 495–96. The questions read:
4. Assuming it is decided that segregation in public schools violates the Fourteenth
Amendment (a) would a decree necessarily follow providing that, within the limits set by
normal geographic school districting, Negro children should forthwith be admitted to
schools of their choice, or (b) may this Court, in the exercise of its equity powers, permit
an effective gradual adjustment to be brought about from existing segregated systems to a
system not based on color distinctions?
5. On the assumption on which questions 4(a) and (b) are based, and assuming further
that this Court will exercise its equity powers to the end described in question 4(b), (a)
should this Court formulate detailed decrees in these cases; (b) if so, what specific issues
should the decrees reach; c) should this Court appoint a special master to hear evidence
with a view to recommending specific terms for such decrees; (d) should this Court
remand to the courts of first instance with directions to frame decrees in these cases, and
if so what general directions should the decrees of this Court include and what procedures
should the courts of first instance follow in arriving at the specific terms of more detailed
decrees?
Id. at 496 n.13.
305. 345 U.S. 972 (1953).
306. Brown, 347 U.S. at 495–96.
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Just as Brown was a major victory for the plaintiffs, Brown II was a
disappointment. The Court had agreed on two values—school segregation was
unjustifiable but it must be implemented with tolerance for Southern
sensibilities. Brown I had vindicated the first principle to avoid harming black
children. Now Brown II demonstrated the Court’s sensitivity to the South.
Brown II turned on three basic components. First, the Court recognized
that “a variety of local problems” made school desegregation impervious to a
single national remedy. The cases were accordingly remanded to local federal
and state judges to implement desegregation.
Second, the courts were to be “guided by equitable principles.”307 The
hallmark of equity was “practical flexibility” and balancing “public and private
needs.”308 As such, the lower courts had a good deal of discretion and could
consider, among other things, local “obstacles” to integration. Finally,
desegregation need not occur at once. Rather, defendants were to “make a
prompt and reasonable start” and it was to proceed with “all deliberate
speed.”309
Predictably, the Southern states had argued for delay. At oral argument
they argued that school desegregation would lead to interracial marriage,
sexual promiscuity and the spread of venereal disease from the black to the
white population. They argued black children were intellectually inferior. One
attorney suggested to Chief Justice Warren that the South would not comply
with a Court decree. Citing their shattered state of mind, they proposed a
veritable obstacle course of hearings at which those seeking desegregation
would bear the burden of proof. The NAACP proposed that the process begin
in fall 1955 and be completed a year later. The Government proposed an
intermediate position. Citing the Court’s reliance on psychological harm to
black children, the Government argued that “[i]n similar fashion, psychological
and emotional factors are involved.”310
The remedy took the pressure off the South. Gradualism, not immediacy
was the Court’s timetable for desegregation. “All deliberate speed” was an
oxymoron that signaled to the South that it could take its time. It did.
How might one account for the timidity of Brown II after the boldness of
Brown I? To some extent the two were a package. The justices agreed to rule
for the plaintiffs regarding the constitutional norm with the understanding that
the remedy would be more modest. In some respects, the result reflected a
familiar legal strategy—balance a victory on liability with a reduced remedy.
The justices thought unanimity was important, yet part of its cost was a
tolerant remedy.

307.
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309.
310.
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The Court might also have been wary of issuing an order it could not
enforce. The justices, like the lawyers, had studied the familiar account of
Marbury in which Chief Justice Marshall avoided issuing an order to Secretary
of State James Madison that he could not enforce. The Justice Department
recommended a gradual approach, and President Eisenhower showed no
disposition to crusade for school desegregation.
Brown I had met some Southern resistance. The justices no doubt feared
violence would greet immediate desegregation. They may also have thought
they could appease moderate Southerners with a more measured approach.311
Could the Court have followed a different course? Southern resistance was
probably inevitable. Justice Black had favored limiting the decree to the
named plaintiffs only, not classes of students. Yet he predicted that
Southerners would “fight” and that there would “be a deliberate effort to
circumvent the decree.”312 Although Professor Klarman regards Brown as
“misguided,” he argues that the justices should not be accused of calculating
foolishly.313 “They operated without the aid of historical hindsight, and their
prediction that conciliation on their part would strengthen [S]outhern
moderates and encourage compliance was plausible.”314
Similarly, Judge Wilkinson argues that “[i]t was not hesitancy on the part
of the Supreme Court that amplified the volume of [S]outhern protest in the
years after Brown. The impulse of obstruction was too indigenous, too deeply
embedded politically, historically, socially, psychologically, economically,
sexually, and in every other way.”315 “Deliberate speed,” Wilkinson argued,
“tried to balance [in reasonable fashion] “the historical realities, to redeem the
injustices of history without reopening its wounds.”316
The Court did not show continuing leadership regarding school
desegregation in the years immediately following Brown. By the same token,
it had little power to order the South, and the President showed little
disposition to help. A decade after Brown almost nothing had changed
regarding desegregation of Southern schools.
Black children entered
segregated Southern public schools in 1955 and were still attending segregated
schools a decade later. During this time, the Court largely absented itself from
school desegregation cases. The Court assumed a more active role in the late
1960s. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and subsequent legislation provided the
Executive Branch with tools to persuade many districts to integrate. The Court
ordered the time for deliberation finished and approved more aggressive

311.
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313.
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instruments, like busing, to achieve integration. Substantial progress was made
until the courts and political leadership retreated during the latter part of the
Twentieth Century. The story of those cases, and their impact, provides a
related, but separate, topic for constitutional law.
IX. CONCLUSION
This Essay has suggested some of the angles that might prove fruitful in
teaching Brown. Many streams, some suggested in passing, run through
Brown. Brown is our principal case about race and education but is also a
springboard to other civil rights decisions in favor of blacks and other
minorities. It was a reference point for the school desegregation cases of the
1960s and the following decades and of the affirmative action cases during the
last quarter century. It was the paradigm for claims of rights by other
disadvantaged groups. It provides a window into federalism and separation of
powers issues and shows the possibilities, and limitations, of the judiciary to
effect change. It provides a vehicle to test attitudes toward constitutional
interpretation. Ultimately, it is a case about our aspirations for America and
the distance between our ideals and reality.
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